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Abstract
We have shown that belief modelling for dialogue can be simplified
if the assumption is made that the participants are cooperating, i.e.,
they are not committed to any goals requiring deception. In such
domains, there is no need to maintain individual representations of
deeply nested beliefs; instead, three specific types of belief can be
used to summarize all the states of nested belief that can exist about
a domain entity.
Here, we set out to design a “compiler” for belief models. This
system will accept as input a description of agents’ interactions with
a task domain expressed in a fully-expressive belief logic with non-
monotonic and temporal extensions. It generates an operational belief
model for use in that domain, sufficient for the requirements of coop-
erative dialogue, including the negotiation of complex domain plans.
The compiled model incorporates the belief simplification mentioned
above, and also uses a simplified temporal logic of belief based on the
restricted circumstances under which beliefs can change.
We shall review the motivation for creating such a system, and
introduce a general procedure for taking a logical specification for a
domain and procesing it into an operational model. We shall then
discuss the specific changes that are made during this procedure for
limiting the level of abstraction at which the concepts of belief nesting,
default reasoning and time are expressed. Finally we shall go through
a worked example relating to the Map Task, a simple cooperative
problem-solving exercise.
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1 Introduction
Several systems, e.g., TRAINS (Allen et al. 1994) have been produced to
date which model the progress of a dialogue between two agents engaged in
a common task. These systems typically represent agents as having a set of
possible reasoning methods which they can adopt in response to a situation,
e.g., they can react to what has just been said to them, they can make a plan
involving saying something themselves, or they can attempt to recognize the
plan being executed by the agent who just spoke.
All such reasoning must take place in relation to the agents’ beliefs. A
belief model capable of supporting all relevant inferences is thus a necessary
component of a simulated agent. The more complex the reasoning being
done, the more expressive the agent’s belief model must be. In particular, if
agents are going to use planning and plan recognition, they must be capable
of making inferences about nested beliefs, i.e., beliefs about other agents’
beliefs.
Belief models thus correspond to epistemic logics, and are sometimes im-
plemented as theorem provers in standard logics, e.g., Appelt (1985). These
logics allow repeated nestings of beliefs without limit, and are computation-
ally intractable. However, deeply-nested beliefs appear to be useful only in
equally deeply-nested reasoning, e.g., recognizing an agent’s plan to have a
different plan recognized. Reasoning at this depth of nesting is invariably
associated with the attempted practice or recognition of deception.
Furthermore, in most attempts to define logics combining epistemic and
temporal properties, e.g., Moore (1985, Appelt and Konolige (1988) each
level of belief nesting includes a temporal argument, allowing the representa-
tion of propositions such as “Fred believed at 3pm that Doris believed at 6pm
that the cat was out”. Even with a simple representation of time such as the
Situation Calculus (McDermott 1982), such representations result in unnec-
essary complexity, as the persistence of beliefs over time has to be deduced
explicitly at each level.
Noting that some dialogue simulators, e.g., JAM (Carletta 1992) work
well with hard limits on belief nesting and only the simplest representation
of time, we have developed a specification for a belief model which embodies
these limits. We have shown that as far as nesting levels are concerned, the
model’s limitations cause few alterations in dialogue competence and in any
case human dialogue behaviour corresponds in some ways to that of such a
model (Taylor, Carletta, and Mellish 1995). However, the computational ad-
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vantages of such models can only be realized by their use in conjunction with
customized reasoning systems, in which the expressiveness of the formulae
specifying the “ideal” behaviour has been narrowed to cover only the actual
cases embodied by the simplified model.
2 The compiler: an overview
We are currently in the process of building a “compiler” for belief models.
This system will accept as input a description of agents’ interactions with a
task domain, expressed in a fully-expressive belief logic with non-monotonic
and temporal extensions (Taylor 1994b). It produces a self-contained model
of an agent’s beliefs and inferences in the specified domain. This model in-
cludes an interface to events in the simulated domain based on an update
and query language which is a subset of the original fully-expressive lan-
guage. The model can thus be used in conjunction with planning and plan
recognition components to create a full simulated agent for the domain, and
multiple instances of such agents can be made to simulate dialogue.
In overview, the process of compilation is as follows:
1. The fully-expressive specification is checked for constructs which cannot
be compiled; these should not be found necessary in specifications of
plausible domains
2. The specification is translated into a standard form resembling conjunctive-
normal form (CNF)
3. Constructions that would create excess complexity in reasoning about
beliefs or times are substituted for instantiations involving finite sets
of agents, nesting depths or times
4. Clauses that contain no quantifiers are now added as premises or as-
sumptions (if atomic) or justifications (if disjunctive) to an assumption-
based truth maintenance system (DeKleer’s (1986) ATMS). The other
clauses are held in a “rule base”.
5. When an ATMS node unifies with a disjunct in a rule, a new rule or
ATMS entity is generated by substituting the individuals in that node
into the rule
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6. Updates to the model (corresponding to ongoing events in the simulated
domain) are translated using the same process. Queries are handled by
examining the labels of ATMS nodes.
This is a fairly complex process, and will require some elucidation. In
each of the sections that follow, we shall discuss a particular aspect of the
simplifications that are made en route from the fully-expressive specification
language to the operational principles of the compiled belief model. For each
such aspect, we shall examine the following compiler features:
• The restrictions applying to the specification language
• The principles that allow reductions in complexity
• The ways in which these principles are applied
We shall illustrate them with reference to our pilot domain, the Map Task
(Brown et al. 1983). This is a problem in which two agents each have a map,
and one must guide the other along a route marked only on her own map,
with reference to landmarks that may or may not be on both maps.
3 An adequate belief model
If we work on the assumptions that agents are attempting common goals,
and that while agents may also have private goals these never require their
dialogue partners to be misled, we can eliminate the need for explicit deeply-
nested reasoning. Agents will still need to react, to plan and to recognize
plans, but in the case of planning for plan recognition the plan to be rec-
ognized is always part of the speaker’s actual plan. So though planning for
plan recognition always requires deeply nested beliefs, under the cooperative
assumption these are always identical in content to less deeply nested beliefs.
An agent can therefore generate a full repertoire of dialogue behaviour in
a cooperative setting while distinguishing between only three types of nesting
for its beliefs, namely: beliefs about facts at the domain level (non-nested
beliefs), beliefs about the partner’s domain-level beliefs (singly nested beliefs)
and beliefs about what is believed at all deeper levels. We call the last type
residual mutual beliefs (RMB), because if two agents share all three of these
types of belief in a fact, they have mutual belief of that fact. When an agent
has evidence that the individual deeply-nested beliefs that make up a RMB
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differ from each other, the RMB becomes undefined. While this is certainly
a limitation on the capabilities of the agents, it appears that human believers
in cooperative situations behave as if they have similar limitations on their
representational capabilities, i.e., they will avoid utterances that depend for
their success on such beliefs (Taylor and Carletta 1994; Taylor, Carletta, and
Mellish 1995).
Given that we are making the assumption of cooperation throughout, we
must restrict the domain specification to rules appropriate to a cooperative
domain. Specifically we disallow arbitrary implications from one nested belief
to another, e.g., “If A believes X, then B believes Y”. We allow the following
constructs:
• Deduction by an agent, e.g., if Doris has a swamp on her map, and
knows where she should be in relation to the swamp, then she knows
where she should be on the map.
• Relations between domain properties and beliefs, e.g., if Fred says he
has a waterfall, then Doris believes he said this.
• Initial beliefs of the three types mentioned above, e.g., private belief in
the absence of a palm beach from one’s own map, the presence of the
route on one’s partner’s map, and mutual belief in the other relations
described above.
Even with these restrictions, there exists the potential for an unlimited
proliferation of beliefs, as a formula such as P → bel(A, T, P ) can be repeat-
edly unified with its own antecedent. However, when translated into CNF,
each conjunct contains terms separated by at most one level of belief nesting.
Such conjuncts may themselves be beliefs, including mutual beliefs, in dis-
junctions of belief terms, so to create the rule base the mutual belief prefixes
must be expanded into sequences that are then limited to the finite nesting
depth of the rapid model.
The rapid model itself takes the role of a single agent, so beliefs not of
that agent are irrelevant. Terms in the model can have three belief pre-
fixes: obj, meaning an object-level belief of the simulated agent, bel, mean-
ing a belief about the partner’s beliefs, and rmb for residual mutual beliefs.
The rmb level is only added for beliefs that are explicitly mutual, or be-
liefs that recursively imply themselves at deeper levels. So for instance, the
formula ∀A,L,mk(utter(P ) → bel(A, utter(P ))) (i.e., it is mutually known
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that all agents know about all utterances that happen) would be rendered
(¬obj(utter(P ))∨ bel(utter(P )))∧ (¬bel(utter(P ))∨ rmb(utter(P ))). In the
cases where individual agents are named in the specification, e.g., it is mu-
tually believed that Fred does not know where the route is, beliefs of type
rmb cannot be inferred, because they would have to be about that agent’s
beliefs in particular and the rapid model does not allow nesting of its belief
operators.
4 Nonmonotonicity
There are two basic reasons for including nonmonotonic inferences in a logic
of belief for dialogue. Firstly, if the agents are having to cooperate, then
neither initially has full knowledge of the domain, and they must rely on
assumptions in order to make plans to communicate. For instance, in the
Map Task, agents start with the assumption that the landmarks appearing on
their own maps also apear on their partners’ maps. As the dialogue proceeds,
they will occasionally have to abandon such assumptions.
Secondly, cooperating agents use plan recognition to enhance the effec-
tiveness of their communication. Typically an addressee applies plan recog-
nition to the speaker, and then supplements her reactive reply with an initial
utterance addressing an unfulfilled goal in the recognized plan, e.g. Allen
(1983). Since plan recognition is an imprecise process, and indeed most ini-
tial utterances could potentially form part of a number of plans, the beliefs
that one agent ascribes to another in the process of plan recognition follow
in part from assumptions and must be defeasible.
Given the multiple sources of defaults in a belief model, an appropriate
logic is Hierarchical Autoepistemic Logic, or HAEL (Konolige 1988) which
allows such defaults to be prioritized. The specification of default reasoning
in HAEL is extremely flexible; formulae are distributed amongst evidential
spaces, which are partially ordered from strongest to weakest. A modal
operator L
n
allows formulae in any evidential space to refer to the presence
or absence of conclusions in stronger spaces, allowing such concepts as “If
Wilbur is a mammal, conclude that he doesn’t fly, unless there is stronger
evidence that he does”, with the stronger evidential space containing “If
Wilbur is a bat, conclude that he flies, unless there is stronger evidence that
he does not”.
Combining this notation with other modal operators for beliefs causes
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problems; in domains such as the Map Task, the world itself is always a
certain way — it is only the beliefs that are uncertain. This seems to require
that we use the L
n
operator inside the scope of beliefs. However that would
only make sense if the agent’s beliefs were themselves divided into different
evidential spaces, rather than simply occurring in them. In order to avoid
this requirement we never put the L
n
operator inside any modal context;
fortunately, uncertain beliefs and beliefs in uncertainties behave the same
way.
To express the concept of mutual defaults, i.e., things mutually known
to be defaults, without violating this rule, we restrict the specification lan-
guage to normal defaults. These are schemata for propositions which are
always true if not contradicted. A normal default def
n
(P ) is equivalent to
¬L
n
(¬P )→ P , where τ
n
is the evidential space immediately above that con-
taining def
n
(P ). For instance, in the bat example above, we would create a
normal default “terrestrial-mammal” (TM) and write ∀Pdef1(TM(P )), and
thence ∀Xmammal(X) ∧ TM(X) → ¬flies(X). (This can be made even
simpler by using many-sorted logic and allowing mammal to be a sort rather
than a predicate.)
Using def
n
, we can specify mutual defaults without putting any refer-
ences to other evidential spaces inside belief contexts. The behaviour of a
mutual default mdef
n
(P ) is defined as if by: (∀Pmdef
n
(P ) → def
n
(P )) ∧
(∀A, T, Pmdef
n
(P )→ mdef
n
(bel(A, T, P ))). A Map Task agent’s belief that
all landmarks appear on both maps unless they are known not to, is thus a
mutual default; it will hold at any level of nesting unless specifically blocked
at that level.
Constrained to these schemata, defaults can be added to the rapid model
without any further simplification. Mutual defaults are replaced by individ-
ual default beliefs at each of the nesting levels explicitly represented, just as
mutual knowledge is replaced by individual beliefs. The individual defaults
specify the generation of assumed nodes in the ATMS, with the assumption
indicating the evidential space in which the default holds. Where a proposi-
tion and its negation both exist as nodes in the ATMS, the truth value of each
is worked out by looking at the labels of both to see which has justification
in which evidential space; the outcome may be:
• One has justification in a stronger space than the other; it is then true
in all spaces weaker than that space, while the other is not true at all
• Each is justified in a space not ordered with respect to the other; both
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are then true in different spaces
• Both are justified in the same space; this is an inconsistency and should
never happen.
Determining these truth values could be done by placing node states on a
bilattice, as in Ginsberg’s (1988) logical interpretation of the ATMS, or the
pruning routine of the ATMS itself could be enhanced to remove groups of
assumptions contradicted by stronger ones, as well as those contradicting
premises.
5 Time and reasoning about plans
AI research in planning looks at problems that are “nearly decomposable”;
where steps to achieve separate subgoals only occasionally interfere with each
other. There are many temporal formalisms available for representing such
domains in logical notations, but to model agents discussing and reasoning
about such problems, these must be combined with logics of belief. This
invariably results in the need to ascribe a time point or interval to the belief
itself as well as the believed proposition. Nested beliefs need a time point at
each level of nesting, e.g., Moore (1985, Appelt and Konolige (1988). how-
ever, the only respect in which a full temporal logic appears to be necessary is
that of the object level, where getting temporal relations wrong might cause,
e.g., trains to collide.
Beliefs themselves have temporal properties that make them easier to
model than object level facts in a complex domain. They are generated by
acts of observation or inference and persist just until some other observation
or inference overturns them. Modelling such persistence in temporal logic
requires the application of a frame axiom, and where there are several types
of event that can overturn a belief these must be circumscriptive, i.e., be
expressible as “In the absence of any conclusion that belief B is contradicted
at time T1, allow it to persist to T2”. Such axioms are also necessary to model
persistence in the domain, but because here only certain types of event can
influence a given property, circumscriptive axioms and their extra logical
complexity are typically not required Allen and Ferguson (1994).
The need to model the behaviour of beliefs over time is the main moti-
vation for the use of the ATMS. Indeed this is the motivation behind many
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RMSs; we have chosen the ATMS simply because it has the closest corre-
spondence in its functionality to the evidential spaces of HAEL. In its role
as a continuing simulation of a believer confronting new evidence concerning
an essentially static world (i.e., the Map Task), the ATMS nodes need make
no reference to time at all. So our tactic in translating formulae referring to
times for use in the rapid model is simply to strip out all temporal arguments
from belief operators, and replace all temporal relations with true.
But our agent shares her world with others, whose beliefs also change, so
as well as the case familiar in RMSs where beliefs are revised in response to
stronger evidence (as discussed by Ga¨rdenfors (1988)), beliefs about beliefs
can also become out of date. For instance, in the Map Task, one agent
may at one point believe that the other does not know where a particular
landmark is, but at a later point she may realize that from the information
she has provided, the other agent has now deduced where it is. This would be
awkward if such beliefs are added to the ATMS as premises, as there is no way
of retracting a premise, so they must be made into assumed nodes. Each time
a justification for a ¬bel(. . .) or ¬rmb(. . .) node is added, a special assumption
is included in its antecedents. This assumption includes the ordinality of the
time at which it is added, so when labels justifying contradictory beliefs are
compared, that depending on the most recent evidence can be preferred.
When we extend the system to cope with domains in which physical
change occurs, such as the TRAINS world, we will need a more complex
representation of temporal interactions. Chapman (1987) points the way for
doing temporal reasoning in a network structure; the truth of a proposition
at a given time in his planner TWEAK is defined by a modal truth criterion
(MTC). Taylor (1994a, Ch. 4) describes how a simplified version of Chap-
man’s MTC can be used in conjunction with the ATMS to model an agent’s
estimation of the value of a proposition at a given time as knowledge of rel-
evant events at earlier times is added to the agent’s world knowledge. Here,
the system is also used for keeping track of other agents’ beliefs, a task for
which it is overcomplex. Such a system in conjunction with the currently pro-
posed method of tagging out-of-date beliefs should result in a highly efficient
system for reasoning about plans.
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6 A simple illustration
The compiler itself is currently under construction. So far, we have devel-
oped a characterization of the Map Task supporting the same dialogues as
Carletta’s JAM (1992) as a test domain. This characterization has been for-
malized in our fully-expressive language, and we have completed a package
in Prolog for carrying out the first stage of its conversion to to the rapid
model, i.e., conversion into CNF. The resulting characterization can be anal-
ysed with a theorem prover, also written in Prolog, to illustrate that the
desired inferences all follow, although quite understandably, the computa-
tional complexity of actually following a whole dialogue by this means is
prohibitive.
In parallel with this exercise we hace constructed a rapid model for the
same task, based on an ATMS and a rule-based inference system as has been
described for the models generated by the compiler. This was originally de-
veloped simply with the object of constructing a working system to support
Map Task dialogue simulation (Taylor 1993). For the purposes of the work
described here, it was compared with the logical characterization of the do-
main, and then both were refined to the point where an orderly relationship
existed between the formulae of one and the node names and inference rules
of the other. This relationship conformed to the overview of the compilation
process given in section 2, and is the basis for the automated translation
from one to the other which is the subject of work at the time of writing.
When this is complete, the next step will be to specify the update and query
language; this will be a simplified version of the fully-expressive language
used to create the model, eliminating modal operators except when applying
to whole formulae.
To illustrate the compilation process as it is curently envisaged, we will
take just a few axioms from the Map Task; those required for one agent to
believe that after the other has given him a description of part of the route, he
believes the other agent to believe as a default that he is vividly acquainted
with that route section. We use many-sorted notation, for the practical
advantages noted by (Walther 1987) and because it allows time and agent
variables to be marked for the special preprocessing they require. Informally,
the language describes the domain as follows: terms can be of sort agent,
time, landmark, route section, map item, mood (of an utterance), relation
or prop (standing for propositions in quantified modal formulae.) The sorts
landmark and route section are subsorts of map item. We then have the
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following predicates to comprise what agents can know about the domain:
vivid(L) Equivalent to the conjunction of predicates
defining where L is (always true at domain level)
mapped(L) Equivalent to the conjunction of predicates
asserted by the perception of L on the map
(only makes sense within belief scope)
desc(L, R, M) Landmark L is in relation R to landmark M
say(A, T, M, P) Agent A at T voiced proposition P with mood M
6.1 The relevant axioms in the fully-expressive lan-
guage
The axioms are as follows:
Map information makes landmarks vivid
∀X :map item mk(mapped(X) => vivid(X)) (1)
Utterances always get heard:
∀X :agent, Y :agent, Z:time,W :time, V :mood, U :prop
mk(say(X,Z, V, U) ∧ before(Z,W ) => bel(Y,W, say(X,Z, V, U))) (2)
All assertions are true (Our model assumes the planner treats truth as a
precondition for utterances; this could be done differently)
∀X :agent, Y :time,W :prop mk(say(X, Y, assert,W ) => W ) (3)
Descriptions confer vividness
∀X :map item, Y :relation, Z:map item
mk(vivid(Z) ∧ desc(X, Y, Z) => vivid(X)) (4)
All landmarks (but not all map items) are expected to be on other agents’
maps
∀X :agent, Y :agent, Z:time,W :landmark
11
mdef20(bel(X,Z, bel(Y, Z,mapped(W )))) (5)
Route sections are known to be on the instruction giver’s (Doris’) map
∀W :agent,X :route section, Y :time, Z:time
mk(bel(W,Y, bel(doris, Z,mapped(X)))) (6)
6.2 Translation into rules for driving the ATMS
These are first translated into CNF, and then fitted to the requirements of
the rapid model. This involves the expansion of mutual beliefs and mutual
defaults into finite series of individual beliefs and defaults about beliefs as
described in section 3. Time parameters are simply stripped out, as there is
currently no use for them in the domain. The results are as follows:
1 becomes:
∀X :map item obj(¬mapped(X) ∨ vivid(X)) (7)
∀X :map item bel(¬mapped(X) ∨ vivid(X)) (8)
∀X :map item rmb(¬mapped(X) ∨ vivid(X)) (9)
2 becomes:
∀V :mood, U :prop ¬obj(say(doris, V, U)) ∨ bel(say(doris, V, U))) (10)
∀V :mood, U :prop ¬bel(say(doris, V, U)) ∨ rmb(say(doris, V, U))) (11)
A similar pair relating to Fred are also created. Note that the original im-
plication from a shallow nested belief to an identical deeper one allows the
rmb(. . .) to be included.
3 becomes:
∀W :prop obj(¬say(dorisassert,W ) ∨W ) (12)
∀W :prop bel(¬say(dorisassert,W ) ∨W ) (13)
∀W :prop rmb(¬say(dorisassert,W ) ∨W ) (14)
4 becomes:
∀X :map item, Y :relation, Z:map item
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obj(¬vivid(Z) ∨ ¬desc(X, Y, Z) ∨ vivid(X))) (15)
∀X :map item, Y :relation, Z:map item
bel(¬vivid(Z) ∨ ¬desc(X, Y, Z) ∨ vivid(X))) (16)
∀X :map item, Y :relation, Z:map item
rmb(¬vivid(Z) ∨ ¬desc(X, Y, Z) ∨ vivid(X))) (17)
5 becomes:
∀W :landmark def20(bel(mapped(W ))) (18)
∀W :landmark def20(rmb(mapped(W ))) (19)
6 becomes:
∀X :route section bel(mapped(X)) (20)
This is the only rule produced for this formula; although the original refers
to all levels below the first, putting rmb(mapped(X)) here would refer to
Doris’ beliefs about Fred’s map.
6.3 Operation of the ATMS model
All the above contain quantifiers, so none of them cause any nodes to be
added initially to the ATMS. Formulae corresponding to map information
are also included; these will be added using the update and query lan-
guage. Suppose Fred has a swamp on his map, which he refers to in-
ternally as swamp 1. His database is initially updated with the proposi-
tion obj(mapped(swamp 1)) which, containing no quantifiers, is added as a
premise in the ATMS. Once in the ATMS, a test is made to see if it resolves
with any disjunct from the rule base; it does with 7, and the substituted ver-
sion of this is added to the ATMS as a justification from obj(mapped(swamp 1))
to obj(vivid(swamp 1)), the latter being supported by this justification.
Now suppose Fred’s partner Doris opens the dialogue by saying “The first
part of the route goes left of the palm beach”. As we are looking at a database
that is modelling Fred, his hearing this utterance is modelled by his awareness
of it being established by its assertion in the update and query language:
obj(say(doris, assert, desc(section 1, left of, palm beach 1))). This too is
unquantified, so produces a premise node in the ATMS. It unifies with 10 to
produce bel(say(doris, assert, desc(section 1, left of, palm beach 1)), which
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in turn unifies with 11 justifying
rmb(say(doris, assert, desc(section 1, left of, palm beach 1)). These three
unify with terms in 12 – 14 to justify beliefs at the three levels in the actual
description, which in turn unify with 15 – 17 to produce justifications for
vividness of the first section based on vividness of the palm beach.
However the nodes obj(vivid(palm beach 1)), bel(vivid(palm beach 1))
and rmb(vivid(palm beach 1)) as yet have no justification. They do however
unify with 7 – 9, giving them justifications from obj(mapped(palm beach 1)),
bel(mapped(palm beach 1)) and rmb(mapped(palm beach 1)), and the lat-
ter two of these match up to the default clauses in 18 and 19, which re-
sult in assumptions being created for them. bel(mapped(palm beach 1))
and rmb(mapped(palm beach 1)) each get a def20 assumption, which is cre-
ated with a serial number. These assumptions are propagated through
the links that have been added, and appear in the labels of the nodes for
bel(vivid(section 1)) and rmb(vivid(section 1)). The first of these is made
a premise by 8 and 20, and the assumption label for this becomes redundant
and is removed by the ATMS, but the second remains as an assumption.
This is the situation illustrated in figure 1. What happens next is that
Fred makes an utterance indicating he has not understood the description;
this will give him a justification for ¬rmb(vivid(section 1)) depending only
on a current time-stamp assumption. This will form a contradiction with
the positive node and result in the assumption justifying it (def20 2) being
removed from the system. Subsequently, queries to the database regarding
the status of rmb(vivid(section 1)) will be answered in the negative. In her
next utterance, Doris may offer Fred a description of the palm beach in terms
of the swamp, which he has (and which she can assume him to have). This
will create a new justification for rmb(vivid(section 1)), resulting in the first
section finally becoming mutually vivid for them.
7 Conclusion
The compiler should illustrate the adequacy of belief models of the type that
we propose, by allowing the creation of a number of such models and their
comparison with the results that would be obtained directly from the original
specification of the domain, as well as the performance of systems using these
models in conjunction with planning and plan recognition systems to model
conversational agents.
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obj(mapped(swamp_1))
[premise]
obj(vivid(swamp_1))
{{}}
obj(desc(section_1, left_of, 
palm_beach_1))
{{}}
palm_beach_1))
{{}}
(section_1, left_of, palm_beach_1)))
obj(say(doris, assert, desc
[premise]
(section_1, left_of, palm_beach_1)))
(section_1, left_of, palm_beach_1)))
{{}}
{{}}
bel(say(doris, assert, desc
rmb(say(doris, assert, desc
bel(desc(section_1, left_of, 
palm_beach_1))
{{}}
rmb(desc(section_1, left_of, 
obj(vivid(section_1))
bel(vivid(section_1))
rmb(vivid(section_1))
obj(vivid(palm_beach_1))
bel(vivid(palm_beach_1))
rmb(vivid(palm_beach_1))
bel(mapped(palm_beach_1))
rmb(mapped(palm_beach_1))
{}
{}
{{def_20_1}}
{{def_20_2}}
{{def_20_1}}
{{def_20_2}}
{{def_20_2}}
{{def_20_1}}
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Furthermore it is expected that the models produced by the compiler in
this way will have sufficiently rapid performance to allow their use in real-
time dialogue systems. This is the case for a prototype model developed for
a Map Task dialogue system, whereas use of an automated theorem prover
working in the unrestricted logical language in this domain appears to be
impossible due to computational complexity.
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